Background. The paper analyzes a setting in which a manufacturer (he) and a retailer (she)
The common signal game serves as a benchmark and represents the manufacturer's full-information outcome. The private signal game highlights how he incurs a hidden-information cost compared to the common signal game. The TCA game highlights how the mechanism allows the manufacturer to eliminate or reduce the hidden-information cost. The pre-signal terms engage the retailer before observing the signal and induce her to make a decision under high uncertainty. As a result, she ends up over-invested when the signal turns out low. The post-signal terms engage her after the signal, allowing her to make use of the information and purchase additional stock efficiently depending on the forecast signal. This ability to utilize the forecast information allows the manufacturer to set more efficient prices and/or extract higher fixed transfers. It is important to note that designing the same contract that engages the retailer only before or only after she receives the forecast information is a special, sub-optimal case of the TCA mechanism. On the one hand, if the manufacturer designs a contract that induces the retailer to act only after she observes the signal, he cannot force her to bear high uncertainty and over-invest. In such case, he fully incurs the hidden-information cost. If he designs a contract that induces the retailer to act only before she observes the signal, the value of the signal information will be lost and he will not be able to set his terms as efficiently.
Later, she can place a second order according to the post-signal terms whenever she receives the forecast.
